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You Have the Right to Remain
Silent... Sort of:
Berghuis v. Thompkins, the Social
Costs of a Clear Statement Rule, and
the Need for Amending the Miranda
Warnings
Jaime M. Rogers*

I. INTRODUCTION

In June 2010, the Supreme Court of the United States handed
down its decision in Berghuis v. Thompkins. 1 The case involved a
murder suspect who was arrested one year after the fact, 2 and
who made "inculpatory statements" 3 after remaining "'[1]argely'
silent during the interrogation, which lasted about three hours."4
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed a jury conviction of first-

* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law, 2012;
B.A., University of Colorado Boulder, 2002. The author would like to thank
the members of the Roger Williams University Law Review for their
assistance in bringing this piece to publication. Special thanks are due to
Robert, Karen, and especially Liza for their unceasing love and support.
1. 130 S.Ct. 2250, 2250 (2010).
2. Id. at 2256.
3. Id. at 2257; see also id. at 2266 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (referring
to the statements as "inculpatory").
4. Id. at 2256 (alteration in original); see also id. at 2266 (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting) (describing the arrestee's behavior as "tacit and
uncommunicative through nearly three hours of police interrogation").
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degree murder, 5 and a majority of the Supreme Court comprised
of Justices Kennedy, Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito upheld
the conviction 6 on the grounds that the suspect had not invoked
his right to remain silent,7 but had instead waived that right.8
Justices Sotomayor, Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer dissented. 9
The result reached by the Court is incorrect because: (1) the
result contravenes law established by the Court in Miranda v.
Arizona;'0 (2) the Court misapplied precedent established in Davis
v. United States and North Carolinav. Butler;"I and (3) the Court
improperly emphasized the question of invocation, while
improperly relegating the question of waiver, and relied on
factually unsupported premises in the analysis of both questions.
Further, the result reached by the Court creates a standard that is
likely to entail significant social costs, which is a paramount
reason for amending the Miranda warnings so that they
effectively apprise arrestees of their rights.
Part II provides a detailed overview of the facts and
procedural history of the case. In Part III, I examine the Court's
analysis and holdings and discuss why parts of the majority
opinion are incorrect. In Part IV, I discuss the significant social
costs that are likely to result from the Court's decision and I
provide an argument for amending the Miranda warnings. In
Part V, I conclude that if the Court's decision is to stand, the
Miranda warnings must be amended.
II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A shooting in Southfield, Michigan on January 10, 2000
resulted in the death of Samuel Morris and the injury of Frederick
France. 12 Van Chester Thompkins was identified as a suspect in
5. People v. Thompkins, No. 242478, 2004 Mich. App. LEXIS 322, at *1,
*13 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2004).
6. Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2255, 2265.
7. Id. at 2260.
8. Id. at 2263.
9. Id. at 2266.
10. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts
Court and CriminalProcedureat Age Five, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 13, 19 (2010)
("It is impossible to reconcile the Supreme Court's decision in Berghuis v.
Thompkins with Miranda v. Arizona.").
11. 512 U.S. 452 (1994); 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
12. Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2256.
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the shooting, but apparently fled before being arrested in Ohio
approximately one year later. 13
Detective Christopher Helgert and partner, of the Southfield,
Michigan Police Department, traveled to Ohio to interrogate
At the beginning of the
Thompkins after his arrest. 14
interrogation, Helgert presented Thompkins with a written
"Notification of Constitutional Rights and Statement ''15 which
contained the following five statements:
1. You have the right to remain silent.
2. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a
court of law.
3. You have a right to talk to a lawyer before answering
any questions and you have the right to have a lawyer
present with you while you are answering any questions.
4. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be
appointed to represent you before any questioning, if you
wish one.
5. You have the right to decide at any time before or
during questioning to use your right to remain silent and
your right to talk with a lawyer while you are being
questioned. 16
Helgert asked Thompkins to read the fifth statement aloud,
Helgert then read the first four
which Thompkins did. 17
statements aloud to Thompkins and asked Thompkins to sign the
form "to demonstrate that he understood his rights," which
Thompkins declined to do. 18 The Court noted that the record
evidence was unclear as to whether Thompkins gave any verbal
acknowledgement that he understood his rights.19
Thompkins's only statements throughout the interrogation
13. Id.
14. Thompkins v. Berghuis, 547 F.3d 572, 576 (6th Cir. 2008).
15. Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2256.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. ("[A]t a suppression hearing, Helgert testified that Thompkins
verbally confirmed that he understood his rights . .. [but] at trial, Helgert
stated, 'I don't know that I orally asked him' whether Thompkins understood
his rights.").
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consisted of "a few limited verbal responses," "nodding his head,"
saying "he 'didn't want a peppermint" that was offered to him,
and saying that the chair "he was 'sitting in was hard.' 2 ° After
approximately two hours and forty-five minutes of interrogation,
Helgert asked Thompkins whether he believed in God, to which
21
as his eyes 'well[ed] up with tears."'
Thompkins replied "'Yes,'....
Helgert then asked Thompkins whether he prayed to God, to
which Thompkins also replied "'Yes,"' and finally whether
Thompkins .'pray[ed] to God to forgive [him] for shooting that boy
down"' to which Thompkins again replied "'Yes."' 22 Thompkins
declined to make a written confession and the interrogation ended
about 15 minutes later. 23 As the dissenting Justices noted, "the
'only thing [Thompkins said] relative to his involvement [in the
shooting]' occurred near the end of the interview-i.e., in response
to the questions about God."24
Prior to trial, Thompkins moved to suppress the statements
obtained during the interrogation on the grounds he had invoked
his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, that he had not
waived his right to remain silent, and that the statements were
involuntary.2 5 The motion to suppress was denied,2 6 and a jury
convicted Thompkins of, among other charges, first-degree
murder. 27 Thompkins was sentenced to life in prison without
The Court of Appeals of Michigan affirmed the
parole. 2 8
conviction. 29 The Michigan Supreme Court denied Thompkins's
application for appeal. 30 The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan denied Thompkins's request for
habeas corpus relief, 3 1 holding, in relevant part, that "[t]he
Michigan Court of Appeals' rejection of [Thompkins's] Fifth
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
(Mich.
28.
29.
30.
31.
70204,

Id. at 2256-57 (citation omitted).
Id. at 2257 (citation omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 2267 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Id. at 2257.
Id.
People v. Thompkins, No. 242478, 2004 Mich. App. LEXIS 322, at *1
Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2004).
Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2258.
Thompkins, 2004 Mich. App. LEXIS 322, at *13.
Thompkins v. Berghuis, 547 F.3d 572, 579 (6th Cir. 2008).
Thompkins v. Berghuis, No. 05-CV-70188-DT, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
at *46 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 28, 2006).
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Amendment claim.., was not an unreasonable application of
clearly established law" because Thompkins did not invoke the
right to remain silent after he was advised of his Miranda
32
rights.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
reversed the District Court's denial of habeas relief as to
Thompkins's Fifth Amendment claim. 33
The Sixth Circuit's
analysis began with whether Thompkins had waived his right to
remain silent, 34 which the court held was the dispositive
question. 3 5 The court noted that, under Miranda, "'a heavy
burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege
against self-incrimination, '' 36 and that 'a valid waiver will not be
presumed... simply from the fact that a confession was in fact
eventually obtained.' 37 Further, the court noted that, under
Butler,38 there exists a strong presumption against waiver, 39 and
under Smith v. Illinois, "'[i]nvocation and waiver are entirely
distinct inquiries, and the two must not be blurred by merging
them together."' 40 The court held that the Michigan Court of
Appeals "misrepresent[ed] the record" when it found that
"Thompkins 'talk[ed] with [Helgert], albeit sporadically,"' 4 1 and
therefore ruled that the District Court "erred in denying
Thompkins's petition for a writ of habeas corpus because the
Michigan Court of Appeals's rejection of his Fifth Amendment
claim 'was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in
light of the evidence' and 'involved an unreasonable application

32. Id. at *41.
33. Thompkins, 547 F.3d at 592.
34. Id. at 582.
35. See id. at 584 n.4 ("Because the resolution of this issue [of
invocation] is not critical to the outcome in this case-that is, we conclude
that the prosecution failed to meet its 'heavy burden' in first showing that
Thompkins waived his Miranda rights-we need not address Thompkins's
arguments that the Davis standard does not apply to invoking the right to
remain silent.").
36. Id. at 582 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966)).
37. Id. (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475).
38. 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979).
39. Thompkins, 547 F.3d at 582.
40. Id. (quoting 469 U.S. 91, 98 (1984)).
41. Id. at 585 (quoting Thompkins v. Berghuis, No. 05-CV-70188-DT,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70204, at *38 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 28, 2006)).
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of[] clearly established Federal law,"' 42 specifically Miranda and
Butler.4 3 According to the Sixth Circuit, "Thompkins's persistent
silence for nearly three hours in response to questioning and
repeated invitations to tell his side of the story offered a clear and
unequivocal message to the officers: Thompkins did not wish to
44
waive his rights."
The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's grant of
habeas relief. 45 The Court's analysis began with the question of
invocation, and the Court noted that, under Davis, in order for an
invocation of the right to counsel to require the police to stop the
invoke
the
right
the
arrestee
must
interrogation,
"'unambiguously."' 4 6 The Court held that "there is no principled
reason to adopt different standards for determining when an
accused has invoked the Miranda right to remain silent and the
Miranda right to counsel at issue in Davis."47 The Court
concluded that because "Thompkins did not say that he wanted to
remain silent or that he did not want to talk with the police," he
did not invoke his right to remain silent. 4 8 Proceeding to the
question of waiver, the Court held that "[w]here the prosecution
shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was
understood by the accused, an accused's uncoerced statement
establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent."4 9 The
Court concluded that because there was "no contention that
Thompkins did not understand his rights," and because
Thompkins answered Helgert's question about praying to God for
42. Id. at 588 (alteration in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2265 (2010).
46. Id. at 2259 (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459
(1994)).
47. Id. at 2260.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 2262. In reaching this holding, the Court relied on Butler, 441
U.S. 369, 373, 379 (1979), for the proposition that a waiver can be implied
from the totality of the circumstances; on Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157,
168 (1986), for the proposition that the "heavy burden" required to show a
Miranda waiver can be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence; and on
Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573-75 (1987), Connecticut v. Barrett, 479
U.S. 523, 530 (1987), and Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1986), for
the proposition that the prosecution must show that the accused understood
his Miranda rights before a waiver can be implied. Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at
2261.
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forgiveness for shooting Morris, and because there was no
evidence that Thompkins's statement was coerced, Thompkins
waived his right to remain silent. 50 "In sum, a suspect who has
received and understood the Miranda warnings, and has not
remain silent by
invoked his Miranda rights, waives the right 5to
1
making an uncoerced statement to the police."
III.

EXAMINATION OF THE COURT'S ANALYSIS AND HOLDINGS

A. Invocation of the right to remain silent
A key part of the Court's analysis was its holding that "there
is no principled reason to adopt different standards for
determining when an accused has invoked the Miranda right to
remain silent and the Miranda right to counsel at issue in
Davis."52 This holding is unsound for several reasons.
First, the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and right to
counsel are different rights, such that the right to counsel is
designed to protect the right to remain silent.53 Given this design,
we should expect that the right to remain silent, the
superordinate right, be afforded greater protection than the right
to counsel, the subordinate right. The Court in Miranda spoke to
this very notion when it held that "[i]f the individual indicates in
any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he
wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.... If the
individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation
must cease until an attorney is present."54 It is apparent from the

50.

Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2262-63.

51.

Id. at 2264.

52.
53.

Id. at 2260.

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966) ("[T]he right to
have counsel present at the interrogation is indispensable to the protection of
the Fifth Amendment privilege under the system we delineate today."); id. at
470 ("[T]he need for counsel to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege. ..");
id, at 471 ("[A]n individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed
that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with
him during interrogation under the system for protecting the privilege we
delineate today."); see also Marcy Strauss, The Sounds of Silence:
Reconsidering the Invocation of the Right to Remain Silent Under Miranda,
17 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS.J. 773, 817 (2009) ("The right to counsel exists
only to protect the right to remain silent-the right to be free from compelled
self-incrimination.").
54. 384 U.S. at 473-74 (emphasis added).
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language of Mirandathat different standards were meant to apply
to the invocation of the right to remain silent and the invocation of
the right to counsel-the Miranda Court made it clear that the
invocation of the right to remain silent could be by "indicat[ion] in
any manner," while the invocation of the right to counsel must be
by "state[ment]. '5 5 The Court's holding in Davis is consistent with
this,5 6 but there is no reason to believe that the Miranda Court
intended that an arrestee's invocation of the right to remain silent
must be by statement, given that the Court used the word "states"
to describe the standard for the invocation of the right to counsel
and instead used the words "indicates in any manner" to describe
the standard for the invocation of the right to remain silent. 57 The
rationale offered by the Court in Berghuis, that invocation of the
right to remain silent and the right to counsel should be subject to
the same standards because "[b]oth protect the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination," 58 while true so far as it goes, fails
to account for the primacy of the right to remain silent and ignores
the law established by the Court in Miranda.
Second, invocation of the right to remain silent can be
achieved nonverbally, while the right to counsel is less susceptible
to nonverbal invocation. That is to say, it is reasonable to
conclude that after remaining nearly totally silent for two hours
and forty-five minutes, as in Berghuis,59 the arrestee has invoked
or is invoking his right to remain silent. 60 After all, the Miranda
warnings do not mention anything about invocation, and the idea
that the exercise of a right differs importantly from the invocation
of the right is hardly a matter of common sense. 6 1 Again, it is
55. Id.
56. 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1996) (holding that an arrestee's invocation of the
right to counsel must be unambiguous).
57. 384 U.S. at 473-74.
58. 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010).
59.

Id. at 2257.

60. The dissent recognized this when it held that a suspect's sitting
silent throughout prolonged interrogation "cannot reasonably be understood
other than as an invocation of the right to remain silent." Id. at 2275-76
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
61. See id. at 2276 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("Advising a suspect that
he has a 'right to remain silent' is unlikely to convey that he must speak (and
must do so in some particular fashion) to ensure the right will be protected•..
• [Tihe Miranda warnings give no hint that a suspect should use ... magic
words...."). See also infra Part IV(B).
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clear that the Miranda Court intended to allow for nonverbal
invocation of the right to remain silent when it held that:
If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time
prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain
silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point he has
shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment
privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes
his privilege cannot be other62 than the product of
compulsion, subtle or otherwise.
In addition to the foregoing principled reasons, there are
additional factual reasons that render the Berghuis Court's
reliance on Davis unsound. First, the Court ignored that the facts
63
of Davis are critically distinguishable from the facts of Berghuis.
Specifically, after being advised of his Miranda rights, Davis
"waived his rights to remain silent and to counsel, both orally and
in writing." 64 This waiver was essential to the holding in Davis
"that, after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights,
law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and
unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney." 65 On the other
hand, in Berghuis, there was no express waiver of any kind.66
Second, the interrogating officers in Davis made it clear that
"if [Davis] want[ed] a lawyer, then [they] w[ould] stop any kind of
questioning with him, that [they] weren't going to pursue the
matter unless [Davis clarified whether his statement, 'Maybe I
should talk to a lawyer,' was a request for a lawyer or just a
comment about a lawyer]," to which Davis replied 'No, I'm not
asking for a lawyer,"' and 'No, I don't want a lawyer."' 67 On the
other hand, in Berghuis, Helgert and his partner made no attempt
62. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
63. This point was also raised by the dissent. See Berghuis, 130 S.Ct. at
2275 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
64. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 455 (1994).
65. Id. at 461 (emphasis added).
66. See Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2267 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ('The
record contains no indication that the officers sought or obtained an express
waiver."); id. at 2270 ("It is undisputed here that Thompkins never expressly
waived his right to remain silent.").
67. 512 U.S. at 455 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at
461 ("[W]hen a suspect makes an ambiguous or equivocal statement it will
often be good police practice for the interviewing officers to clarify whether or
not he actually wants an attorney.").
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to seek clarification from Thompkins regarding whether he was
invoking his right to remain silent, or to inform Thompkins that if
he was invoking his right to remain silent, Helgert and partner
would be required to stop questioning him. It may be reasonable
to require an unambiguous invocation of the right to counsel
under circumstances such as those in Davis, where the arrestee,
after making an ambiguous invocation of the right to counsel, was
informed of the need for clarity, as well as the fact that the police
were prepared to honor his invocation, and that they would be
required to stop questioning him in the event that he made an
unambiguous invocation, and the arrestee then specifically
declined to invoke his rights. 68 On the other hand however, it is
objectively unreasonable to require an unambiguous invocation of
the right to remain silent from an arrestee such as Thompkins
who had remained silent for two hours and forty-five minutes of
interrogation, 69 and apparently had no idea of the need for an
70
invocation of any kind, let alone an unambiguous invocation.
Opting for the ease of a bright-line rule, the Berghuis Court
also held that "[i]f an ambiguous act, omission, or statement could
require police to end the interrogation, police would be required to
make difficult decisions about an accused's unclear intent and face
the consequence of suppression 'if they guess wrong."' 7' This is
unsound because it suggests that a rule requiring the police to
credit an arrestee's ambiguous acts or omissions necessarily leads
to guesswork, which is not true. When an interrogating officer is
confronted with an ambiguous act or omission on the part of an
arrestee, the officer has the option to ask questions to clarify the
arrestee's intent, rather than resort to trying to guess what the
arrestee's intent may be. 72 Thus, because officers are not
68. Id. at 455.
69. Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2257.
70. See id. at 2275-76 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("[O]ther statements or
actions-in particular, when a suspect sits silent throughout prolonged
interrogation, long past the point when he could be deciding whether to
respond-cannot reasonably be understood other than as an invocation of the
right to remain silent.").
71. Id. at 2260 (quoting Davis, 512 U.S. at 461).
72. For example, an officer could say, "I'm unclear as to whether you are
invoking your right to remain silent. You can exercise your right to remain
silent by continuing to remain silent, but if you want us to stop questioning
you, you need to tell us that you are 'invoking' your right to remain silent.
Are you invoking your right to remain silent?" This is more or less what the
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required, under the current Miranda warnings, to inform
arrestees that an unambiguous verbal invocation of the right to
remain silent is necessary in order to cut off questioning, and
because officers enjoy discretion to employ the extraordinarily
practicable option of simply asking questions to clarify an
arrestee's ambiguous intent, it is unsound to resolve the
possibility of "'difficulties in proof' 73 against the arrestee. In
Berghuis, there was nothing to suggest that Thompkins was
aware of the need for any sort of invocation of the right to remain
silent in order to cut off questioning, and the interrogating officers
elected not to ask clarifying questions to determine whether
Thompkins was attempting to invoke his right to remain silent, or
to inform Thompkins that if he were to invoke his right to remain
74
silent, the officers would be required to stop questioning him.
Further, "contemporary police practice" is "not to engage in
prolonged interrogation after a suspect has failed to respond to
initial questioning" 75-a demonstrably workable standard that
has provided enough clear guidance that76 the Court's new brightline rule may be altogether unnecessary.
Finally, the Court held that "[s]uppression of a voluntary
confession in these circumstances [of ambiguity] would place a
significant burden on society's interest in prosecuting criminal

officers in Davis did, which the Court in that case referred to as "good police
practice." 512 U.S. at 455, 461; see also Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2276
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("If a suspect makes an ambiguous statement or
engages in conduct that creates uncertainty about his intent to invoke his
right, police can simply ask for clarification."); Tom Chen, Davis v. United

States: "Maybe I Should Talk to a Lawyer" Means Maybe Miranda is
Unraveling, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 607, 639 & n.259 (citing pre-Davis scholarship
advocating the use of clarifying questions).
73. See Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2260 (quoting Davis, 512 U.S. at 458-59).
74. See id. at 2256-57.
75. Id. at 2276 n.8 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Brief for the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the American Civil
Liberties Union as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 32-34, Berghuis
v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010) (No. 08-1470)) (referencing various
leading law enforcement training materials).
76.
See id. at 2276 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (discussing how
experience with the fact-specific standard of Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96
(1975), shows that the need for a bright-line rule may not be as great as the
majority suggests); id. at 2277-78 & n.9 (discussing how application in other
jurisdictions of the bright-line rule advanced by the majority has led to
unreasonable results).
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activity."7 7 This holding is also unsound because it assumes 78a
voluntary confession, which was a disputed issue in the case,
and because it ignores the compulsion inherent in custodial
interrogations. 79 Further, this holding also fails to consider that
under current police protocol, extended silence is deemed to be an
invocation of the right to remain silent, 80 so that the "significant
burden" that the majority warned would be "place[d] ... on
society's interest in prosecuting criminal activity"' 8 1 amounts to

little more than a sort of fear mongering that tends to obfuscate
fundamental American values such as the presumption of
innocence, the right to be free from self-incrimination, and the
82
prevention of erroneous convictions.
B. Waiver of the right to remain silent
Proceeding to the question of waiver, the Court held that "[a]s

77. Id. at 2260.
78. Id. at 2257. The Berghuis Court acknowledged that at trial
Thompkins argued that his statements were not voluntary, but held that
"[t]he fact Helgert's question referred to Thompkins's religious beliefs... did
not render Thompkins's statement involuntary." Id. at 2257, 2263.
79. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455 (1966) ("[T]he very fact of
custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on
the weakness of individuals."); id. at 468 ("[A] warning is an absolute
prerequisite in overcoming the inherent pressures of the interrogation
atmosphere."); id. at 476 ("ITlhe fact that the individual eventually made a
statement is consistent with the conclusion that the compelling influence of
the interrogation finally forced him to do so."); id. at 478 ("In [non-custodial
questioning] situations the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of
in-custody interrogation is not necessarily present.").
80. Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2270 n.3 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(referencing various leading law enforcement training materials) (citing Brief
for the National Association of Criminal Defense, supra note 75, at 11-12).
81. Id. at 2260.
82. "Benjamin Franklin thought '[t]hat it is better a hundred guilty
persons should escape than one innocent person should suffer."' Alexander
Volokh, Aside: n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 175 (1997). The
Berghuis dissent discussed other "fundamental values" related to the
"constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination," such as "society's
'preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal
justice'; a 'fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by
inhumane treatment and abuses' and a resulting 'distrust of self-deprecatory
statements'; and a realization that while the privilege is 'sometimes a shelter
to the guilty, [it] is often a protection to the innocent."' Berghuis, 130 S. Ct.
at 2273 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S.
680, 692 (1993)).
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a general proposition, the law can presume that an individual
who, with a full understanding of his or her rights, acts in a
manner inconsistent with their exercise has made a deliberate
choice to relinquish the protection those rights afford., 83 The
Court relied on the facts that Thompkins received a written copy
of the Miranda warnings and that the officer determined that
Thompkins could read and understand English in determining
that "[t]here was more than enough evidence in the record to
84
conclude that Thompkins understood his Miranda rights."
However, this conclusion is unsound because it relies on the
assumption that an arrestee's ability to read and hear certain
words necessarily indicates that the arrestee fully understands
the legal significance of those words. This is important because a
simple "understand [ing] ' '85 of the Miranda rights is insufficient;
rather, the Court noted, a "full understanding"8 6 of the rights is
required.8 7 Thompkins's declination to sign the "Notification of
Constitutional Rights and Statement" form, which he was asked
to sign to "demonstrate that he understood his rights," provides a
compelling basis from which to conclude that Thompkins did not
understand his rights.8 8 After an arrestee has decided to exercise
his right to remain silent (that is, to remain silent), what more can
he do to communicate that he does not understand his rights but
refuse to sign a form which purports to show that he does
understand his rights?
The Court went on to hold that "Thompkins's answer to
Helgert's question about praying to God for forgiveness for
shooting the victim was sufficient to show a course of conduct
indicating waiver."89 This conclusion is erroneous for several

83. Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2262.
84. Id. The majority cited two other facts, which added very little, if
anything, to the quantum of evidence from which the majority drew its
conclusion. They were: (1) that "Thompkins was given time to read the
warnings"; and (2) that Thompkins "read aloud the fifth warning." Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. I contend infra Part IV.B that even if an arrestee fully understands
the Mirandawarnings as currently formulated, there is no reason to believe
that the arrestee would understand the need for an unambiguous invocation
of the rights or that a waiver of rights could be implied after hours of silence.
88. See id. at 2256.
89. Id. at 2263.
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reasons. First, Thompkins's course of conduct is more accurately
characterized by his declination to sign the "Notification of
Constitutional Rights and Statement" form 90 and his overall
silence, 9 1 which together form a pattern of behavior that lasted for
92
two hours and forty-five minutes of the three-hour interrogation.
Furthermore, the "course of conduct" contemplated by Butler and
its progeny requires something more substantial than a one-word
93
remark after two hours and forty-five minutes of silence.
Finally, the statement indicating the waiver cannot also be the
contested statement-the Miranda Court made it clear that a
valid waiver 94and an inculpatory statement must be discrete from
one another.
Regarding the voluntariness of Thompkins's statement, the
Court held that "there is no evidence that Thompkins's statement
was coerced" and "there is no authority for the proposition that an
interrogation of [three hours] is inherently coercive." 95 The Court
noted that "even where interrogations of greater duration were
held to be improper, they were accompanied, as this one was not,
90. Id. at 2256; see also id. at 2270 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
("[Thompkins's] refusal to sign even an acknowledgment that he understood
his Mirandarights evinces, if anything, an intent not to waive those rights.").
91. Id. at 2256 ("Thompkins was '[1largely' silent during the
interrogation.").
92. Id. at 2256-57.
93. See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 370, 373 (1979). In Butler,
the arrestee verbally acknowledged that he understood his rights and
verbally agreed to talk to interrogators, and although the Court found a
waiver in that case, it held that " [t]he courts must presume that a defendant
did not waive his rights; the prosecution's burden is great." Id. at 370-71,
373; see also Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2270 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting
Butler, 441 U.S. at 373) ("In these circumstances, Thompkins' 'actions and
words' preceding the inculpatory statements simply do not evidence a 'course
of conduct indicating waiver' sufficient to carry the prosecution's burden .... I
believe it is objectively unreasonable under our clearly established precedents
to conclude the prosecution met its 'heavy burden' of proof on a record
consisting of three one-word answers, following 2 hours and 45 minutes of
silence punctuated by a few largely nonverbal responses to unidentified
questions.").
94. 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966) ("The warnings required and the waiver
necessary in accordance with our opinion today are . . .prerequisites to the
admissibility of any statement made by a defendant."); see also Berghuis, 130
S. Ct. at 2270 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("Miranda and Butler expressly
preclude the possibility that the inculpatory statements themselves are
sufficient to establish waiver.").
95. Berghuis, 130 S.Ct. at 2263.
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by other facts indicating coercion .... ,,96 This is erroneous
because there is, in fact, authority for the proposition that lengthy
interrogations can be inherently coercive, even absent other facts
indicating coercion. To wit, the Court in Miranda held both that
lengthy interrogations can be inherently coercive even absent
evidence of "threat[s], tricke[ry], or cajol[ing]" by the police, 97 and
that the mere fact of a custodial interrogation can be inherently
coercive absent specific forms of "brutality."98 In addition, the
Berghuis Court's own recognition that "[c]ooperation with the
police may result in more favorable treatment for the suspect...
[and] the prevention of continuing injury and fear"9 9 clearly
suggests that police interrogations are inherently coercive.
The Court also held that "[t]he fact that Helgert's question
referred to Thompkins's religious beliefs ... did not render
Fifth
'the
statement involuntary" because
Thompkins's
Amendment privilege is not concerned with moral and
psychological pressures to confess emanating from sources other
than official coercion."' 100 This is erroneous to the extent that it
asserts that Fifth Amendment protections under Miranda do not
contemplate moral or psychological pressures, 10 1 and it is
misleading to the extent that it suggests that custodial
interrogation itself does not constitute a form of official

96.

Id.

97. 384 U.S. at 476 ("[T]he fact of lengthy interrogation or
incommunicado incarceration before a statement is made is strong evidence
that the accused did not validly waive his rights. In these circumstances the
fact that the individual eventually made a statement is consistent with the
conclusion that the compelling influence of the interrogation finally forced
him to do so. It is inconsistent with any notion of a voluntary relinquishment
of the privilege. Moreover, any evidence that the accused was threatened,
tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did
not voluntarily waive his privilege.").
98. Id. at 455 ("Even without employing brutality, the 'third degree' or
[other] specific stratagems... the very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a
heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals.").
99. Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2264.
100. Id. at 2263 (quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 (1986))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
101. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448 ("[W]e stress that the modern practice
of in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather than physically oriented.
As we have stated before . . 'this Court has recognized that coercion can be
mental as well as physical."') (citation omitted).
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coercion. 102 Further, given the two hours and forty-five minutes of
interrogation that passed before Thompkins's statement, 10 3 the
sensitive personal nature of religion, and the emotional response
that accompanied Thompkins's statement, 10 4 there is ample
evidence that Thompkins's statement was not voluntary, in the
sense that the statement would not have been
made but for the
05
compulsion associated with the interrogation. 1
A key holding of the Court with respect to the issue of waiver
was that "Thompkins knowingly and voluntarily made 10 a6
statement to police, so he waived his right to remain silent."'
However, this is erroneous because under Miranda and Butler,
the waiver, rather than the statement, must be knowing and
voluntary.107 In Miranda, the Court's holding that "the individual
may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to
answer questions or make a statement" highlights the idea that
the waiver and the statement are distinct and that the knowing
and voluntary standard applies to the waiver, not the
statement. 108 The Court in Butler affirmed that the knowing and
voluntary standard applies to the waiver, rather than to the
statement, when it held that "[t]he question [of waiver] is...
whether the defendant in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived
the rights delineated in the Miranda case." 109 By concluding that
Thompkins's waiver was his statement, the Court misapplies the

102. See id. at 455 ("Even without employing brutality, the 'third degree'
or the specific stratagems.., the very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a
heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals.")
103. Berghuis, 130 S.Ct. at 2257.
104. In response to Helgert's question whether Thompkins believed in
God, 'Thompkins made eye contact with Helgert and said 'Yes,' as his eyes
'well[ed] up with tears."' Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
105. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 462 (quoting Brain v. United States, 168 U.S.
532, 549 (1897)) ('The rule is not that, in order to render a statement
admissible, the proof must be adequate to establish that the particular
communications contained in a statement were voluntarily made, but it must
be sufficient to establish that the making of the statement was voluntary;
that is to say, that, from the causes which the law treats as legally sufficient
to engender in the mind of the accused hope or fear in respect to the crime
charged, the accused was not involuntarily impelled to make a statement
when but for the improper influences he would have remained silent."').
106. Berghuis, 130 S.Ct. at 2263.
107. See 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979); 384 U.S. at 479.
108. See 384 U.S. at 479.
109. 441 U.S. at 373.
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knowing and
voluntary standard set out in Miranda and affirmed
110
in Butler.
The Court's holding that Butler foreclosed Thompkins's
argument that "the police were not allowed to question him until
they obtained a waiver first," because the idea of requiring a
waiver first is, according to the Court, inconsistent with the
principle established in Butler that a waiver can be implied,' is
also erroneous. The recognition that a waiver can be implied is
not inconsistent with the requirement that the waiver must occur
at the outset of questioning. Certainly, it is not difficult to
conceive that an arrestee's conduct could give rise to an implied
waiver at the outset of questioning, such as if the arrestee
acknowledged that he understood his rights, or verbally agreed to
talk, or began to talk without being questioned, none of which
were true of Thompkins. Although the Court in Butler held that
"in at least some cases waiver can be clearly inferred from the
actions and words of the person interrogated,"1' 12 the Court in that
case did not provide any clear guidance regarding the amount or
kind of actions or words from which a waiver could be implied.
Further, the arrestee in Butler verbally acknowledged that he
understood his rights, and verbally stated that he did not wish to
exercise his right to remain silent, 113 which renders the facts of
that case critically distinguishable from the facts in Berghuis.
Although Butler established that a waiver can be implied, the
specific issue in that case did not concern the right to remain
silent, 114 and Butler did not specifically overrule the waiver-first
115
language of Miranda.
110. See 441 U.S. at 373; 384 U.S. at 479.
111. See Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2263.
112. 441 U.S. at 373.
113. Id. at 370-71 ('When [the arrestee was] asked if he understood his
rights, he replied that he did.... [Arrestee also said], 'I will talk to you but I
am not signing any form."').
114. Id. at 374 ('The only question is whether he waived the exercise of
one of those rights, the right to the presence of a lawyer."). See also supra
Part IILA, arguing that the right to remain silent should be afforded greater
protection than the right to counsel.

115.

See id. at 375-76; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479 ("After such warnings

have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may
knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions
or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waiver are
demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of
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Finally, the Court held that "[Miranda] waivers can be
established even absent formal or express statements of waiver
that would be expected in, say, a judicial hearing to determine if a
guilty plea has been properly entered," 116 and that "Miranda
rights can.. . be waived through means less formal than a typical
waiver on the record in a courtroom ... ." 117 This too is erroneous
because given that the primary effect of a Miranda waiver is to
facilitate an adjudication of guilt," l8 we should expect Miranda
waivers to be afforded the same protection as other waivers that
lead to an adjudication of guilt. The Court's reliance on the fact
that Miranda waivers occur outside the courtroom to support its
holding that Miranda waivers are not entitled to the same
protection as in-court waivers1 19 is unsound because it is in the
interrogation setting that official coercion and the lack of
12 0
assistance of counsel are most likely to be present
circumstances that would also tend to warrant at least equivalent
protection of the arrestee's rights.
IV. SOCIAL COSTS THAT ARE LIKELY TO RESULT FROM THE COURT'S
DECISION AND AN ARGUMENT FOR AMENDING THE MIRANDA WARNINGS

A. Social costs of applying a clear statement rule to the invocation
of the right to remain silent
Most people who are arrested are low-income, minority,
and/or undereducated. 12 1
Low socioeconomic status is also
interrogation can be used against him.").
116. Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2261.
117. Id. at 2262.
118. The Court in Miranda referred to confessions as 'the most
compelling possible evidence of guilt."' 384 U.S. at 466 (quoting Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 685 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
119. Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2262 ("Miranda rights can therefore be
waived through means less formal than a typical waiver on the record in a
courtroom ...

given the practical constraints and necessities of interrogation

and the fact that Miranda's main protection lies in advising defendants of
their rights.").
120. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461 ("As a practical matter, the compulsion to
speak in the isolated setting of the police station may well be greater than in
courts or other official investigations, where there are often impartial
observers to guard against intimidation or trickery.").
121. See Miranda,384 U.S. at 473 ("[I]ndigent[s] [are] the person[s] most
often subjected to interrogation.... ."); Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation
of Indigent Defense Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 427, 428
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122
independently correlated with low educational achievement.
Individuals with low levels of educational achievement are
unlikely to have a sound understanding of their rights or the rules
governing police interrogation, and may also lack the capacity to
formulate and deliver an unambiguous invocation of their right to
remain silent. 12 3 This incapacity is likely to be exacerbated by the

(2009) ("Poor people account for more than eighty percent of individuals
prosecuted in this country."); Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime and the Pool of
Surplus Criminality: Or Why the "War on Drugs" was a "War on Blacks", 6 J.
GEN. RACE & JUST. 381, 400 (2002) ("A growing body of evidence suggests that
Blacks are investigated and detained by the police more frequently than are
other persons in the community."); Grace F. Ashikawa, Note, R.V. Brydges:
The Inadequacy of Miranda and a Proposal to Adopt Canada'sRule Calling
for the Right to Immediate Free Counsel, 3 SW. J.L. & TRADE AMERICAS 245,
267-68 ("The vast majority of persons arrested or detained for interrogation
are poorly educated and indigent."); Matthew Dickman, Comment, Should
Crime Pay?: A CriticalAssessment of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act
of 1996, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1687, 1695 (2009) ("Over 85 percent of federal
criminal defendants are indigent at the time of their arrest."); Margaret E.
Finzen, Note, Systems of Oppression: The Collateral Consequences of
Incarceration and Their Effects on Black Communities, 12 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL'Y 299, 321 (2005) ("[M] embers of Black communities... are
disproportionately policed, arrested, prosecuted, and convicted."); Stephen J.
Schulhofer & David D. Friedman, Reforming Indigent Defense: How Free Market
PrinciplesCan Help to Fix a Broken System, CATO INST. POLY ANALYSIS No. 666 at 2
(2010) ('The great majority of people arrested and prosecuted are indigent.");
Melanca Clark & Emily Savner, Community Oriented Defense: Stronger
Public Defenders, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE at 7 (July 21, 2010),
available at
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resourceCODreport/
("More people travel though America's criminal justice system than any other
justice system in the industrialized world. And these people are
overwhelmingly
from
low-income,
African-American
and
Latino
communities."). The Court in Miranda emphasized the particular importance
of the warnings to low-income and poorly educated arrestees when it noted
that "[t]he potentiality for compulsion is forcefully apparent, for example, in
Miranda, where the indigent Mexican defendant was a seriously disturbed
individual with pronounced sexual fantasies, and in Stewart, in which the
defendant was an indigent Los Angeles Negro who had dropped out of school
in the sixth grade." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457.
122. Selcuk R. Sirin, Socioeconomic Status and Academic Achievement: A
Meta-Analytic Review of Research, 75 REV. EDUC. RES. 417, 438 (2005)
(analyzing research findings on socioeconomic status and academic
achievement published in scholarly journal articles between 1990 and 2000
and finding that "[o]f all the factors examined in the meta-analytic literature,
family [socioeconomic status] at the student level is one of the strongest
correlates of academic performance").
123. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 469-70 (1994) (Souter, J.,
concurring) ("A substantial percentage of [criminal suspects] lack anything

742 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW [Vol. 16:723
mistrust of police
that is common among low-income and minority
24
demographics. 1

The social costs of applying a clear statement rule to the
invocation of the right to remain silent are clear and perniciousapplication of the clear statement rule announced by the Court in
Berghuis will have a disproportionately adverse impact on lowincome, minority, undereducated, and other demographics that
may already be intimidated by or mistrustful of police, while
potentially having no effect on more affluent, non-minority groups.
The Court recognized this disparate impact in Davis when it
noted that "requiring a clear assertion of the right to counsel
might disadvantage some suspects who-because of fear,
intimidation, lack of linguistic skills, or a variety of other
reasons-will not clearly articulate their right to counsel although
they actually want to have a lawyer present." 125 However, the
Davis Court simply dismissed this concern by pointing out that:

[T]he primary protection afforded suspects subject to
custodial interrogation is the Miranda warnings
themselves. "[F]ull comprehension of the rights to remain
like a confident command of the English language; many are 'woefully
ignorant'; and many more will be sufficiently intimidated by the interrogation
process or overwhelmed by the uncertainty of their predicament that the
ability to speak assertively will abandon them.") (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted); Chen, supra note 72, at 643 (arguing that the clear
statement rule announced in Davis "would mainly affect the rights of two
main groups of individuals: those that do not have the communication skills
to adequately make an unambiguous request for counsel and those who are
so intimidated by the police that they do not or cannot make an unambiguous
request").
124. Kami Chavis Simmons, New Governance and the "New Paradigm"of
PoliceAccountability: A DemocraticApproach to Police Reform, 59 CATH. U. L.
REV. 373, 411-16 (2010) ("Police-citizen interactions in poor, urban, and

minority communities have consistently been strained. Numerous studies
and polls show that minority groups have a disturbingly negative perception
of police officers .... Courts, police experts, and government officials alike
have recognized the negative perceptions that minority communities have of
the police. . . . [E]mpirical evidence supports the notion that African
Americans' perceptions of mistreatment and differential treatment by the
criminal-justice system are in fact substantiated.").
125. Davis, 512 U.S. at 460; see also id. at 470 n.4 (Souter, J. concurring)
("Social science confirms what common sense would suggest, that individuals
who feel intimidated or powerless are more likely to speak in equivocal or
nonstandard terms when no ambiguity or equivocation is meant.... Suspects
in police interrogation are strong candidates for these effects.").
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silent and request an attorney [is] sufficient to dispel
whatever coercion is inherent in the interrogation
process." A suspect who knowingly and voluntarily
waives his right to counsel after having that right
explained to him has indicated his willingness to deal
26
with the police unassisted. 1
The Court's rationale is untenable because it assumes that
the Miranda warnings are sufficiently "expla[natory]" to effect a
"[flull comprehension"' 127 of the arrestee's rights, which is neither
objectively true, nor true with respect to the low-income, minority,
and undereducated demographics that account for the majority of
arrestees. 128 Indeed, the Court in Miranda emphasized this very
notion when it acknowledged that "[a]s with the warnings of the
right to remain silent and of the general right to counsel, only by
effective and express explanation to the indigent of this right can
there be assurance that he was truly in a position to exercise
it." 129
The costs of the clear statement rule announced by the Court
in Berghuis are not limited to the low-income, minority, and
undereducated demographics discussed above; rather, the costs
are likely to be society-wide. 130
The economic costs of
administering
criminal
justice
systems,
especially
the
astronomical economic costs associated with incarceration, are
borne by taxpayers. Requiring arrestees to unambiguously invoke
their right to remain silent is likely to result in more convictions,
many of which will be erroneous because the cases will have
turned on unreliable confessions 13 1 made as a result of inherently

126. Id. at 460-61 (citations omitted).
127. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
128. See supra note 121.
129. 384 U.S. 436, 473 (1966).
130. See id. at 480 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485
(1928) (Brandeis J., dissenting)) (noting both that .'[iun a government of laws,
existence of the government will be imperilled [sic] if it fails to observe the
law scrupulously"'); id. (quoting Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism and State
CriminalProcedure, 70 HARv. L. REV. 1, 26 (1956)) ("The quality of a nation's
civilization can be largely measured by the methods it uses in the
enforcement of its criminal law'.").
131. The Court in Miranda referred to confessions as 'the most
compelling possible evidence of guilt."' Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466 (quoting
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 685 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
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coercive custodial interrogations. 132 This is likely to effectuate a
vicious feedback loop of increasing society-wide costs as more
people are incarcerated, confidence in the criminal justice system
is eroded, 133 and individuals released from incarceration are
unable, owing to their criminal record, to secure lawful
employment. 134
The inability of some to secure lawful
employment is likely to lead to further criminality and/or
increased reliance on social welfare programs, both of which will
further impact taxpayers.
B. The need for amending the Miranda warnings
The Miranda warnings were formulated for the purpose of
"secur[ing] the privilege against self-incrimination,"' 135 and the
Court in Miranda required that the warnings "adequately and
effectively apprise [an arrestee] of his rights." 136 The Miranda
Court also intended for "the warning [to] show the individual that
to recognize his privilege should he
his interrogators are prepared
137
choose to exercise it."
Portions of the Court's opinion in Berghuis rely on the idea
that the Mirandawarnings are sufficient to effectively secure the
privilege against self-incrimination. 138 The Berghuis Court held
132. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455 ("[Tlhe very fact of custodial
interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the
weakness of individuals."); id. at 468 ("[A] warning is an absolute
prerequisite in overcoming the inherent pressures of the interrogation
atmosphere."); id. at 476 ("[Tjhe fact that the individual eventually made a
statement is consistent with the conclusion that the compelling influence of
the interrogation finally forced him to do so."); id. at 478 ("In [non-custodial
questioning] situations the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of
in-custody interrogation is not necessarily present.").
133. The American Bar Association has noted that "legal institutions in a
constitutional democracy depend on popular participation and support to
maintain their authority." See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble at
6 (2009).
134. Anne Piehl, Crime, Work, and Reentry, Urban Institute Reentry
Roundtable Discussion Paper at 3 (2003), available at www.urban.org/
uploadedpdf/410856piehl.pdf("It is well known, and well documented, that
prisoners have employment prospects and employment outcomes that are
much worse than those of the rest of the population.").
135. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
136. Id. at 467; see also id. at 445 (contemplating that the warnings would
be "full and effective").
137. Id. at 468.
138. See 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2261 (2010).
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that "[t]he main purpose of Miranda is to ensure that an accused
is advised of and understands the right to remain silent and the
right to counsel"; 13 9 that "Miranda's main protection lies in
advising defendants of their rights"; 140 and that "'the primary
protection afforded suspects subject[ed] to custodial interrogation
is the Miranda warnings themselves. ' 14 1 However, the current
Miranda warnings are insufficient, especially given Berghuis's
clear statement rule, to facilitate an adequate understanding of an
arrestee's rights or to effectively secure the privilege against selfincrimination, and continued reliance on the current warnings
is
42
therefore inconsistent with any fair administration of justice. 1
The Court in Berghuis ultimately held that "a suspect who
has received and understood the Miranda warnings, and has not
invoked his Miranda rights, waives the right to remain silent by
making an uncoerced statement to the police," 143 and that an
arrestee's invocation of his right to remain silent must be
unambiguous. 14 4 But the Miranda warnings themselves give
absolutely no indication of these rules, and no amount of common
sense would suggest to an average person, let alone an average
arrestee, that the exercise of the right to remain silent (that is,
simply remaining silent) differs importantly from the invocation of
45

the right. 1

The Miranda warning given in Berghuis, which is typical and
which was considered approvingly by the Court, provides:
1. You have the right to remain silent.
2. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a
court of law.
3. You have a right to talk to a lawyer before answering
139. Id.
140. Id. at 2262.
141. Id. at 2263 (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 460
(1994)).
142. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 472 ("[A]uthorities... have the obligation
not to take advantage of indigence in the administration of justice.").
143. 130 S.Ct. at 2264.
144. Id. at 2260.
145. See id. at 2276 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("Advising a suspect that
he has a 'right to remain silent' is unlikely to convey that he must speak (and
must do so in some particular fashion) to ensure the right will be protected..
• [And] the Miranda warnings give no hint that a suspect should use . . .
magic words .... ").

746 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 16:723
any questions and you have the right to have a lawyer
present with you while you are answering any questions.
4. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be
appointed to represent you before any questioning, if you
wish one.
5. You have the right to decide at any time before or
during questioning to use your right to remain silent and
your right to6 talk with a lawyer while you are being
questioned. 14

Conspicuously absent from these warnings is any suggestion
of the need to invoke, nevermind unambiguously invoke, one's
right to remain silent in order to cut off questioning, which the
Court in Mosley identified as a "critical safeguard,"'14 7 and with
which the Berghuis Court agreed. 148 Instead, the language of the
warnings speaks only to the fact that an arrestee can "decide...
Thus, a sensible
to use [his] right to remain silent."'149
understanding of the current Miranda warnings would tend to
militate against verbally invoking the right to remain silent, given
that the arrestee is advised that he has the right to remain silent
and that anything he says can and will be used against him. Even
if an arrestee had some independent notion of the need to verbally
invoke the right to remain silent, reliance on the plain import of
the warnings themselves, which we should expect given the
150
overwhelming pressures inherent in custodial interrogations,
146. Id. at 2256.
147. 423 U.S. 96, 103 (1975).
148. Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2260 (quoting Mosley, 423 U.S. at 103)
(quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966)) (internal quotation
marks omitted) ("Thompkins did not say that he wanted to remain silent or
that he did not want to talk with the police. Had he made either of these
simple, unambiguous statements, he would have invoked his right to cut off
questioning.").
149. Id. at 2262. (citation omitted).
150. Miranda,384 U.S. at 455 ("[T]he very fact of custodial interrogation
exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of
individuals."); id. at 468 ("[A) warning is an absolute prerequisite in
overcoming the inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere."); id. at
476 ("[T]he fact that the individual eventually made a statement is consistent
with the conclusion that the compelling influence of the interrogation finally
forced him to do so."); id. at 478 ("In [non-custodial questioning] situations
the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody interrogation
is not necessarily present.").
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would tend to counsel against verbally invoking the right.
Furthermore, the current Miranda warnings, especially after
Berghuis, fail to "show the individual that his interrogators are
prepared to recognize his privilege [to remain silent] should he
151
choose to exercise it," as the Miranda Court contemplated,
because police are currently not required to advise the arrestee
that he must unambiguously invoke his right to remain silent in
order to cut off questioning, and because police are now free to
engage in prolonged interrogation despite an arrestee's steadfast
exercise of his right to remain silent or his imperfect attempt to
invoke the right, and because police are not required to ask
clarifying questions. The result is that police now have an
incentive to interrogate arrestees ad infinitum, with the hope of
eventually discovering an individual weakness that compels the
arrestee to utter something from which courts may now imply a
waiver, in contravention of the law established by the Court in
Miranda.152
The Miranda Court held that:
The warning of the right to remain silent must be
accompanied by the explanation that anything said can
and will be used against the individual in court. This
warning is needed in order to make him aware not only of
the privilege, but also of the consequences of forgoing it.
It is only through an awareness of these consequences
understanding
that there can be any assurance of real
53
1
privilege.
the
of
exercise
and intelligent
The interests of justice dictate, especially after Berghuis, that
in addition to the need to make arrestees aware of the
consequences of foregoing the right to remain silent, the warnings
must also, in keeping with their design to assure a meaningful
understanding and intelligent exercise of the right, make
arrestees aware that a primary consequence of merely exercising
the right to remain silent (that is, simply remaining silent) is to
allow police to continue interrogation, and that a clear invocation
151.
152.

Id. at 468.
See id. at 475 ("[A] valid waiver will not be presumed simply from

the silence of the accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact
that a confession was in fact eventually obtained.").
153. Id. at 469.
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of the right is necessary to cut off questioning.
C. Proposed amendment to the Miranda warnings
The Miranda warnings can be easily amended to fully convey
the scope of an arrestee's rights after Berghuis. Working from the
warnings reproduced above, the following could be added after
part two and before part three: "If you choose to exercise your
right to remain silent by simply remaining silent, we will continue
to question you. However, if you say that you do not want to speak
with us, we will stop questioning you, and we will not be able to
' 154
use that against you in court."
Amending the Miranda warnings in this manner would
require only negligible, if any, economic or other resource
investments. Police officers who are already versed in the delivery
of the current Miranda warnings would not need to be retrained;
rather, officers would simply need to be apprised of the
amendment, which would likely require only minutes to learn.
The amended warnings would not burden police activity because
the amendment would require but a few additional seconds to
deliver, and the amendment does not alter the rights of any
parties.
This proposed amendment to the Miranda warnings is not
inconsistent with earlier opinions in which the Court rejected
arguments that the warnings must be delivered in a particular
way, 155 because the amendment proposed here is simply meant to
effectuate what the Court has already indicated the Miranda
warnings are designed to do, specifically to "adequately and
effectively apprise [an arresteel of his rights"'156 and "to ensure
that an accused is advised of and understands the right to remain
silent and the right to counsel"; 157 and because the message
contained in the proposed amendment could be effectively

154. Other writers have suggested, prior to Berghuis, that the Miranda
warnings be amended to include similar language. See Strauss, supra note
53, at 823.
155. See California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359 (1981) (citation omitted)
("This Court has never indicated that the 'rigidity' of Miranda extends to the
precise formulation of the warnings given a criminal defendant.").
156. Miranda,384 U.S. at 467; see also id. at 445 (contemplating that the
warnings would be "full and effective").
157. Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2261.
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communicated in any number of ways. 1
Amending the Miranda warnings does not require additional
action by the Court. Congress, state legislatures, or state supreme
courts could rise to the task, 159 or police departments60 could
promulgate rules incorporating the proposed amendment. 1
Failure to amend the Miranda warnings would provide an
opportunity and an incentive for police officers to unjustly exploit
the clear statement rule announced by the Court in Berghuis by
interrogating arrestees at length despite their steadfast exercise
of the right to remain silent and their imperfect attempts to
invoke the right, and would also likely exacerbate existing trends
related to the overrepresentation of low-income, minority, and
undereducated demographics in the criminal justice system,
leading to additional taxpayer expense and the erosion of
6
confidence in the criminal justice system. 1 1
V. CONCLUSION

The clear statement rule announced by the Court in Berghuis,
which requires arrestees to unambiguously verbally invoke their
right to remain silent in order to cut off questioning in a custodial
police interrogation, is likely to have a disproportionately adverse
impact
on
low-income,
minority,
and
undereducated
demographics, which account for the majority of arrestees. This
adverse impact can and should be mitigated by amending the
Miranda warnings to reflect the scope of an arrestee's rights,
158. That is, a verbatim recital would not be required.
159. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 ('We encourage Congress and the States to
continue their laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting
the rights of the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our
criminal laws."); id. at 490 ("Congress and the States are free to develop their
own safeguards for the privilege, so long as they are fully as effective as those
described above in informing accused persons of their right of silence and in
affording a continuous opportunity to exercise it.").
160. See Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1206 (2010) (quoting Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 12 Florida v.
Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010) (No. 08-1175) ("[It is 'desirable police practice'
and 'in law enforcement's own interest' to state [Miranda] warnings with
maximum clarity.").
161. The American Bar Association has noted that "legal institutions in a
constitutional democracy depend on popular participation and support to
maintain their authority." See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble at
6 (2009).
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specifically the need to unambiguously verbally invoke the right to
remain silent in order to cut off questioning. The current Miranda
warnings are insufficient to effectively convey this requirement
and therefore fail to fulfill their intended purpose, which is to
"secure the privilege against self-incrimination"' 162 by "adequately
and effectively appris[ing an arrestee] of his rights"'163 and
"show[ing] the individual that his interrogators are prepared to
recognize his privilege should he choose to exercise it."' 6 The
task of amending the Miranda warnings could be undertaken by
legislatures or high courts at the state or federal level, and
implementing the amendment to the Miranda warnings that I
have proposed above would be inexpensive and uncomplicated.
The legal and logical consistency inherent in amending the
Miranda warnings as proposed finds powerful expression in the
oft-quoted passage that "our system of justice is not founded on a
fear that a suspect will exercise his rights. If the exercise of
constitutional rights will thwart the effectiveness of a system of
law enforcement, then there is something very wrong with that
65

system." 1

162. Miranda,384 U.S. at 444.
163. Id. at 467; see also id. at 445 (contemplating that the warnings would
be "full and effective").
164. Id. at 468; see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2261
(2010) ("The main purpose of Miranda is to ensure that an accused is advised
of and understands the right to remain silent and the right to counsel.").
165. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 458 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964)) (internal quotation
marks omitted), quoted in Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2277 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).

